Studies of executive institutions have largely dealt separately with national and international executive institutions (IEIs). This study unpacks and repacks four conflicting decision-making dynamics that unfolds at the frontier of IEIs -that is, at the institutional rim where national and international executive institutions meet, interact and collide. The empirical laboratory utilised is seconded national experts in the European Commission. The survey and interview data presented demonstrates that the decision-making behaviour of seconded national experts includes a mix of departmental (portfolio), epistemic (expert) and supranational behaviour. The suspicion early voiced by Coombes (1970) that seconded national experts to the European Commission are highly conscious of their national background and that they represent domestic Trojan horses into the European Commission is severally challenged by this study. Arguably, the decision-making dynamics observed at the frontier of the Commission seem less affected by the member-state administrations and the international organisation in which the Commission is embedded, and strongly by organisational characteristics of the Commission itself.
Introduction
Institutions are constantly rifted between unity and diversity, autonomy and dependence. This study argues that the European Commission (Commission) faces enduring conflicts between dependence on the member-state governments (Moravcsik 1998) , supranational autonomy (Haas 1958) , inter-DG conflicts and departmental rivalries (Cini 1996; Smith 1994) , and professional concerns (Haas 1992) . The purpose of this study is to illuminate to what extent and how the Commission balances these four dynamics and weaken the dependence on the member-state governments, leaving more space for supranational, departmental and epistemic dynamics. A crucial test of the transformative power of the Commission is the extent to which it manages to weaken intergovernmental behavioural dynamics among individual officials and induce them to supranational, departmental and epistemic behavioural dynamics. An underresearched test-bed thereof is seconded national civil servants hired on short-term contracts and living at the frontier of the Commission (SNEs in Commission phraseology) (Rosenau 1997) . The frontier of the Commission incorporates both loosely organised networks and tightly organised webs of committees, agencies and SNEs. At the frontier of the Commission, SNEs "sort and play out their many contradictions presently at work" (Rosenau 1997: 6; Trondal 2004a ). The White Paper on Governance issued by the Commission (2001) assumes that the 'exchange of staff and joint training between administrations at various levels would contribute to a better knowledge of each other's policy objectives, working methods and instruments' (European Commission 2001:13) . Couched in more analytical terms, 'the future organization of Europe involves a struggle for people's minds, their identities and normative and causal beliefs' (Olsen 2003:58) . Fundamental transformations of political orders are caused not only by organisational reform but by shifting and reorganising behavioural dynamics within existing organisations (Holsti 2004 ).
The study of international organisations and public administration are largely separate scholarly realms (e.g. Cox and Jacobson 1973; Maor and Lane 1999; March 1965; Simmons and Martin 2003) . Moreover, studies of executive institutions have mostly dealt separately with national and international executive institutions (e.g. Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993; Nugent 1997; Reinalda and Verbeek 2004) . National and international administrative orders are often portrayed as two separate systems with rather few intersections (Jachtenfuchs 1997: 2). Moreover, beyond single-case studies there is a surprising dearth of theoretically informed empirical studies of the multiple internal decision-making dynamics of IEIs, including the Commission (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Gehring 2003; Gould and Kelman 1970; Johnston 2003; Mouritzen 1990; Rochester 1986; Trondal 2004a) . The Commission represents the most mature IEI world wide. The Commission also has a long history of integrating member-state administrations into the fabric of day-to-day Commission decision-making, contributing to a "de-bordering" (Kohler-Koch 2005:12) and the emergence of a "multi-level community administration" (Egeberg 2006) at the frontier of the Commission.
Member-state officials may be organisationally integrated into the frontier of IEIs in at least two ways. The first is by inviting member-state officials into permanent and temporary committees at the frontier of the core administration of IEIs (Egeberg, Schaefer and Trondal 2003) . The second is by appointing them outside regular recruitment procedures on short term secondment contracts into the core administration of IEIs (Trondal 2004a) . The High Autority of 1952 was largely staffed by SNEs from the member-state governments, and the intention of its first President (Jean Monnet) was that the High Authority should rely on a seconded, flexible staff of top experts (Duchêne 1994: 240) . However, SNEs have never dominated the Commission staff, but their number has steadily increased in the 1990s, particularly under the Delores Commission, to around 800-900 at present (CLENAD 2003; Trondal 2004a: 71) . SNEs make decisions within the Commission DGs and Units almost on the same footing as permanent A-officials. The dependent variable of this study is the actual decision-making behaviour evoked by SNEs. Arguably, SNEs are rifted between four behavioural logicsintergovernmental, supranational, departmental and epistemic logics. SNEs are multiply embedded and are likely to evoke multiple behaviour logics. They may evoke a government representative (member-state) hat, a supranational (Commission) hat, a departmental (DG/Unit) hat, and/or an epistemic (professional) hat. Each SNE is likely to combine different mixes of this behavioural repertoire in different organisational situations. Whereas intergovernmental behavioural dynamics uphold territorial preferences, concerns, roles and loyalties among SNEs, the latter three dynamics severely weaken the extent to which SNEs represent their home government. Whereas supranational behaviour denote that SNEs have a strong "cosmopolitan" Commission loyalty and act on mandates issued by the Commission politico-administrative leadership, departmental and epistemic behaviour transcend politicoadministrative control from the home government and the Commission leadership.
Departmental behaviour is guided by administrative rules and procedures codified in the portfolios assigned to SNEs. Epistemic behaviour is guided by professional expertise and the educational background of the SNEs, loosely knit to fixed mandates from the Commission and the member-state leadership. These four behavioural logics may be interlinked differently, notably nested, cross-cutting, separate or fused (Herrmann and Brewer 2004:8; Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Risse 2004:251 ).
An organisation theory perspective is suggested to account for the above four behavioural dynamics. Arguably, the behavioural repertoire evoked by SNEs is conditioned by the five following organisational factors: the organisational composition of the Commission, the organisational composition of domestic government systems, degrees of organisational compatibility across levels of governance, recruitment procedures of SNEs, and socialisation dynamics within the Commission. SNEs represent a crucial testing-ground for the independent impact of the Commission organisation because SNEs have multiple organisational belongings and because SNEs are strongly 'pre-packed' and pre-socialised before entering the Commission. SNEs are recruited to the Commission on short term contracts (maximum four years), paid by their home government, and the majority foresee a return to past positions in domestic ministries or agencies when their temporary contracts come to an end (CLENAD 2003) . Hence, one expectation is that SNEs are reluctant to adopt supranational behaviour and more likely to evoke intergovernmental behaviour. However, while working for the Commission, SNEs transfer their primary organisational affiliation from the member-state administration to the Commission. According to the organisation theory approach outlined primary organisations have stronger impact on incumbents than secondary organisations. Hence, SNEs might adopt a supranational behaviour due to their primary Commission affiliations. Moreover, SNEs are employed within sector ministries or agencies in their country of origin before entering the Commission and they are often enrolled within compatible Commission units. Arguably, the organisational embeddedness of SNEs in multiple compatible organisations specialised by purpose and process strengthen and uphold behavioural pattern that correspond to their portfolio (departmental logic) and their professional expertise (epistemic logic).
The article proceeds as follows. The next section is sequenced in two steps.
Step I outlines four decision-making dynamics.
Step II outlines an organisational theory perspective that specifies the organisational contingencies under which each of these decision-making dynamics are evoked by SNEs. The next section presents a rich body of primary survey and interview data on SNEs in the Commission. These data demonstrate that the decision-making behaviour evoked by SNEs contain a mix of departmental, epistemic and supranational behaviour. The suspicion early voiced by Coombes (1970) Theorising decision-making at the frontier of the Commission
Step I: Four ideal-typical decision-making dynamics.
The Commission, like most executive institutions, has an inbuilt tension between different governance dynamics, notably between intergovernmental, supranational, departmental and epistemic dynamics. Organisational stability within the Commission requires balancing these conflicting decision-making dynamics. Organisational transformation implies reorganising existing balances between dynamics by creating new temporary balances among them (Olsen 2005) . Behavioural transformation of SNEs implies a weakening of their intergovernmental behaviour and a strengthening of supranational, departmental and epistemic behaviour.
The Commission may be pictured as constantly ripped between national interests, concerns, roles and loyalties and overarching community interests, concerns, roles and loyalties. This tension is not only challenged during large-scale intergovernmental conferences where the future constitutional fabric is negotiated (Moravcsik 1998) , but also during day-to-day decision-making processes within the Commission (Haas 1958) . The conflict between the concern for national preferences and community preferences is built into the role as a SNE.
Despite SNEs have a formally declared loyalty solely towards the Commission and are supposed to act loyally towards the Commission, they are seconded from their home government. SNEs have only a temporary enrolment in the Commission, they remain paid by their home government during their stay at the Commission and the majority foresee a return to their home government after the secondment period. Still, SNEs have signed a contract formalising that "the SNE shall carry out his duties and shall behave solely with the interest of the Commission in mind" (European Commission 2004: Art. 7:1a) . SNEs may thus activate a dual behavioural repertoire that includes (i) an intergovernmental behavioural pattern, guided by loyalty to their home government, preference for national interests, and intense contacts with their home base, and (ii) a supranational behavioural pattern coached by the top leadership of the Commission, an internalised taken for granted loyalty towards the Commission, and a preference for "the common European good" (see Tables 1 and 2 
below).
The third and fourth decision-making dynamic that is built into the role as a SNE is that between portfolio interests (departmental behaviour) and professional interests (epistemic behaviour) (Radaelli 2001; Smith 2004) . Commission officials, including SNEs, are recruited into DGs and units on issue-specific portfolios and are expected to fulfil the requirements of their assigned portfolio. The departmental dynamic predict SNEs to be "neutral, intelligent, generalist professionals who advice ministers" (Richards and Smith 2004: 779) . SNEs are expected to evoke classical Weberian civil servant virtues, attach identity towards their Commission Unit and DG, and abide to administrative rules and procedures. This is the Westminster model that sees officials as neutral, permanent and loyal (Richards and Smith 2004: 783) . On the other hand, Commission officials are highly educated officials, recruited on the basis of past merits, and with a professional esteem attached to their educational background. The epistemic dynamics predict SNEs to enjoy a great deal of behavioural autonomy. They are assumed to prepare dossiers, argue, negotiate, and co-ordinate with colleagues on the basis of their professional competences and legitimate their authority on neutral competences (Haas 1992) . Their decision-making behaviour is expected to be guided by considerations of scientific and professional correctness and the power of the better argument (Eriksen and Fossum 2000) . This is the 'Monnet official' who is institutionally autonomous and a high-flying technocrat. Table 1 illustrates these four ideal-typical decision-making dynamics.
[ Table 1 about here] Table 2 suggests proxies of these decision-making dynamics.
[ Table 2 about here]
An organisational theory approach.
This section argues that SNEs are likely to evoke departmental, epistemic and supranational behaviour due to the five following organisational factors: the organisational composition of the Commission, the organisational composition of domestic government systems, degrees of organisational compatibility across levels of governance, recruitment procedures of SNEs, and socialisation dynamics within the Commission.
Organisational compositions
This section argues that decision-making dynamics may be accounted for by considering the formal organisation of executive institutions (Holsti 2004) . Arguably, the tensions between conflicting decision-making dynamics reflect the formal organisation of executive institutions. Put generally, behavioural contestation is activated by organisational structures that cross-cuts each other and challenge pre-existing decision-making dynamics. Accordingly, to Schattschneider (1975: 30) "organization is itself a mobilization of bias in preparation for action". Tensions and conflicts among multiple decision-making dynamics within IEIs are thus organisationally contingent. Formal organisations "are collections of structures, rules and standard operating procedures that have a partly autonomous role in political life" (March and Olsen 2005:4) . Civil servants live with a constant overload of potential and inconsistent information that may be attended to at decision situations. Formal organisations guide the decision-making behaviour evoked by civil servants due to the computational limitations among the latter (Simon 1957) . Formal organisations are systematic devices for simplifying, routinising, directing and sequencing information towards particular decision situations (Schattschneider 1975: 58) . The limited cognitive capacities among civil servants are systematised by vertical and horizontal specialisation of formal organisational charts. By specialising organisations each civil servant is assigned a formal role that specifies what problems, solutions and consequences s/he should de/emphasise .
Organisational specialisation lead to local rationalities and local and routinised learning cycles among the incumbents (Haas 2004: 587; Olsen 2005:12) .
Political orders are hybrids and inconsistent collections "of institutions that fit more or less into a coherent system" (Ansell 2004:234; March and Olsen 2005:8) . Formal organisations contain sub-systems organised according to conflicting principles vis-à-vis the core-system.
Organisations tend to accumulate conflicting organisational principles through horizontal and vertical specialisation (Olsen 2005) . "The outcome of the game of politics depends of which, of a multitude of possible, conflicts gain the dominant position" (Schattschneider 1975: 60) .
When specialising formal organisations horizontally, two conventional principles have been suggested by Luther Gulick (1937) . First, formal organisations may be specialised by the major purpose served -like research, health, food safety, etc. This principle tends to activate sectoral preferences and conflicts among incumbents along sectoral cleavages. Co-ordination and contact patterns tend to be channelled within departmental portfolios rather than between them. This mode of horizontal specialisation result in less than adequate horizontal coordination across policy sectors and better co-ordination within policy sectors (Ansell 2004:237) . Arguably, organisation by major purpose served is likely to bias the decisionmaking behaviour of SNEs towards the departmental logic and the epistemic logic. The Commission DG and unit structure is a prominent example of this horizontal principle of specialisation (Egeberg and Trondal 1999) . The Commission is a horizontally pillarised system of government specialised by purpose and with fairly weak organisational capabilities for horizontal co-ordination at the top through Presidential command (Dimitrakopoulos and Kassim 2005) . Domestic central administrations are also often organised according to the principle of purpose (Peters 1995:158) . Hence, we see a compatible organisational specialisation between the Commission and domestic government systems. Organisational compatibility by purpose serves to strengthen departmental and epistemic behaviour.
A second principle of horizontal specialisation also present within the Commission is the principle of the major process utilised -like administration, legal service, personnel services, etc. (Gulick 1937) . Within the Commission the Internal Services like Legal Service and DG for Translation illustrates the process principle. Moreover, domestic ministries are often organised by process, like ministries of administration, ministries of planning, etc. This horizontal principle encourages the horizontal integration of functional departments and the disintegration of the major purposes served. Arguably, organisation by major process is conducive to departmental and epistemic behaviour among SNEs. The Commission and domestic government systems are primarily organised horizontally by purpose, only secondary by function (Egeberg and Trondal 1999) .
Organisational compatibility
Behavioural transformation requires some degree of organisational incompatibility across organisational borders (Egeberg 2004) . Certainly, domestic officials entering the Commission building for the first time are likely to discover non-compatible working environments (March 1994: 70) . The novelty argument claims that people in new situations are likely to change exiting behavioural practices, notably towards a supranational logic (Hoohe 2005:8) . One example of organisational incompatibility is the rare occurrence of enrolment of SNEs into Commission portfolios that depart significantly from previous domestic portfolios. Another incompatible factor is the multi-national demography within Commission DGs, the fact that day-to-day discussions go in several languages, notably English and French, and the fact that the work place is located physically and temporally distant from the domestic government system . The physical structure of the Commission building, the presence of blue flag with the golden stars as well as the member-state flags may also strengthen the perception of organisational incompatibility (Goodsell 1977) . These variables of incompatibility may be conducive to the evocation of a supranational behavioural logic among SNEs. Moreover, the sheer fact that the Commission serve as their primary organisational affiliation may foster supranational behaviour among SNEs (Egeberg 2004 ). 
Recruitment procedures
Decision-making dynamics within executive institutions are dependent on the recruitment procedures because different procedures for recruitment tend to bring in different people and keep them more or less autonomous vis-à-vis past constituencies (Mouritzen 1990: 39) .
Basically, recruitment may be based on a merit principle, as in most Western democracies, and on a quota principle or other systems of patronage or parachutage, as in the top echelon of the American civil service (Ingraham 1995: 9) . Whereas the merit principle recruits permanent civil servants on the basis of competence, the quota principle typically recruits 
Socialisation dynamics
The socialisation variable claims that behavioural practices may change due to individual experiences with particular institutions (Herrmann and Brewer 2004:14) . The potential for socialisation to occur is assumed positively related to the duration and the intensity of interaction amongst the organisational members (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 150; Checkel 2001: 26) . This claim rests on socialisation theory that emphasises a positive relationship between the intensity of participation within a collective group and the extent to which members of this group take the world for granted (Meyer and Rowan 1991) , become victims of 'group think' (Janis 1982) , or develop particular perceptions of 'community methods' (Lewis 2000) . Socialisation is s a dynamic process whereby individuals are induced into the norms and rules of a given community. By this process individuals come to internalise the norms, rules and interests of the community (Checkel 2005) . Socialisation processes are unidirectional in the sense that the socialisator educates, indoctrinates, teaches or diffuses his norms and ideas to the socialisee. Hence, the length of stay at the Commission -or the individual seniority of SNEs -may foster a slow re-socialisation of SNEs towards supranational behaviour (Trondal 2004b ).
Data and method
The observations reported in this study are based on a recent survey and interview study of to other empirical studies that support or reject our findings. In addition, our empirical observations are interpreted by reference to the organisation theory approach outlined above.
Decision-making dynamics among SNEs
This section measures the behavioural patterns of SNEs by considering their contact patterns (Table 3) , their co-ordination patterns (Table 4) , their emphasise on proposals, statements and arguments from different government institutions (Table 5) , their agreement on concrete statements (Table 6 ) and their perceptions of other SNEs with respect to their representational roles (Table 7) .
First, Table 3 measures four contact patterns evoked by SNEs.
[ Table 3 about here] Table 4 reveals the mixed co-ordination patterns among SNEs.
[ Table 4 about here]
The co-ordination patterns evoked by SNEs are ranked as follows: Departmental coordination (mean=48 percent), supranational co-ordination (mean=29 percent), epistemic coordination (mean=20 percent), and intergovernmental co-ordination (mean=6 percent). First, departmental co-ordination is strongly associated with the horizontal specialisation of the Commission services: co-ordination is stronger intra-departmentally than inter-departmentally. According to one SNE, "the administrative borders are distinct" (interviewauthor's transnation). As predicted by our organisation theory approach, intra-DG coordination tends to activate intra-DG conflicts. In the Commission these conflicts tend to follow organisational borders, vertically between Heads of Unit and subordinated officials, and only rarely between nationalities. Moreover, there seem to be fierce horizontal conflicts among A-staff and a low level of conflict between A-staff and SNEs. One reason for the latter observation is that A-staff compete for career advancement whereas SNEs often do not (interviews).
SNEs co-ordinate more frequently within the Commission than externally towards domestic government institutions, reflecting the organisational composition of the Commission services. Moreover, SNEs tend do co-ordinate towards domestic government institutions working within compatible Commission portfolios (departmental co-ordination).
Supranational co-ordination is mainly directed towards the Director of their DG, the Director
General and the Commissioner (and Cabinet) of their DG. "The thing most SNEs comment on is how important the hierarchy in the Commission is" (CLENAD (2002: 43) . Finally, intergovernmental co-ordination is rare and mainly conducted towards the government of other countries.
Next, Table 5 illustrates how SNEs emphasise proposals, statements and arguments from domestic and EU institutions.
[ (2000) anthropological study of the Commission. Table 6 presents how SNEs respond to concrete statements presented to them.
[ Table 6 about here]
By ranking the mean scores of each statement in of Table 6 the following rank-order appears:
Supranational statements (mean=76 percent), departmental statements (mean=55 percent), epistemic statements (mean=55 percent) and intergovernmental statements (mean=3 percent).
First, supranational statements strongly reflect community preferences -that is, EU preferences, preferences for the member-states as a group and preferences of the DG leadership. According to Shore (2000: 152) , SNEs "find it a wonderfully mind-expanding experience: most who come here want to stay after their secondment has finished. Like the agents temporaries ones they get one foot in the door they want to get the rest of their body through" (original emphasis). Hence, a socialisation dynamic towards supranationalism is indeed observed within the Commission, not outside it (Hooghe 2005) . Secondly, the departmental statements reveal a high degree of intra-Unit and intra-DG co-ordination guided The following conditions seem to trigger a formalisation of decision-making processes among SNEs: decisions with budgetary implications, contractual issues, and routine decisions guided by standard operating procedures. Sequentially, the degree of formalisation tends to increase when dossiers reach the final vote inside their Unit and DG. Finally, junior SNEs seem to be guided by formal rules of procedures to a larger extent than senior A-staff (interviews). 7 In sum the interviews paint a picture of the Commission as governed by formal written SNE-rules and informal codes of conduct within their Unit (interviews). These hierarchies live side-by-side and are mutually interdependent.
Being embedded into multiple institutions simultaneously SNEs have several representational roles to play. The respondents were asked to evaluate the roles played by other SNEs. Table 7 presents how SNEs perceive SNEs from other countries as regards the following four representational roles.
[ Table 7 about here] Table 7 confirms that SNEs perceive other SNEs to play mainly two representational rolesthat as an 'independent expert' (epistemic role) and as a 'DG/Unit representative' (departmental role). Of less importance is the role as a 'Commission representative'
(supranational role). The role as a 'government representative' (intergovernmental role) is not perceived important to SNEs. This observation challenges previous studies of SNEs that underscore the national loyalties of SNEs (Coombes 1970; Smith 1973; Smith 2001 ).
Our data demonstrate that SNEs rarely feel a conflict of loyalty between different constituencies, concerns and role ideals. SNEs tend to manage multiple roles (cf . Herrmann and Brewer 2004:12) . One SNE argue that, "my loyalty lies here in the Commission"
(interview -author's translation). At the same time many SNEs agree to the dictum, "I think in my heart I still represent my self" (interview -author's translation). Hence, the assumed loyalty conflict between domestic and supranational constituencies is challenged by the observations presented in Tables 3 to 7 . However, we observe an inbuilt conflict between the role as a departmental official ('DG/Unit representative'), an epistemic official ('Independent expert') and a supranational official ('Commission representative') among SNEs. We thus see a triangular role repertoire among SNEs.
The SNEs were also asked if, before entering the Commission, they thought of EU cooperation as mainly advantageous or disadvantageous. Prior to the secondment period, a large majority of the SNEs was positive to EU integration generally as well as within their portfolios. 52 percent of the SNEs did not change attitude in these regards during their
Commission career. Among those that changed opinion during their secondment period, the net tendency is towards more favourable attitudes towards EU integration. Hence, working as According to Page (1997: 60) , SNEs generally have contacts with the Commission prior to entering it. Frequently, they "indicate a wish to spend three years in Brussels" (Page 1997: 60) . This indicates that supranational identities may reflect processes of pre-socialisation as much as processes of re-socialisation ( (Kerr 1973:76-77) ).
The Commission is a crucial research laboratory for understanding what happens when conflicting decision-making dynamics collide at the frontier of IEIs. "Like other political systems, the EU is struggling to find a balance between the whole and the parts, between unity and disunity, co-ordination and autonomy" (Olsen 2004: 31) 
1)
Four ideal-typical behavioural statements: 1) Intergovernmental statements: -"I put forwards proposals I think is in the best interests of my country" 3 % 2) Supranational statements: -"My proposals are co-ordinated with the leadership of my DG" -"I put forward proposals I think is in the best interest of the member-states as group" -"I put forwards proposals I think is in the best interests of the EU" 
